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I.

INTRODUCTION

In The Death of Contract, Grant Gilmore argued that the once
separate fields of contract and tort had merged into one more general area of "contort."' The term "contort" has since been more
broadly applied to many different areas dealing with the "border" between contract and tort. This article investigates one such area: the
ability of plaintiffs in breach of contract actions to sue in tort.
There are many consequences of allowing a plaintiff to sue in
tort rather than contract. The most important of these is the damages the plaintiff may be awarded. Tort plaintiffs may receive expanded consequential damages, compensation for emotional distress, and punitive damages; contract plaintiffs are generally not
entitled to any of these.!
This article first examines the goals of contract damages under
an economic model. It then explores the extent to which traditional
contract damages fulfill these goals and the rationale for any limits
that appear to prevent this fulfillment. The article explains the
common-law test for attaching a tort claim to a breach of contract action and proposes an alternative framework. Finally, the article applies this proposed framework to a few of the more common
"contorts."

* Associate at Gibbs & Bruns, L.L.P., in Houston, Texas. A.B., 1992, Harvard
College, C.L.G.S.;J.D., magna cum laude, 1996, Harvard Law School. I would like to
thank Professor Scott Brewer of Harvard Law School and Jeffrey C. Alexander of
Gibbs & Bruns, L.L.P., for their help in getting me started on this article. Special
thanks to Jessica A. Roth for her helpful comments and suggestions, and for her
unceasing encouragement and support. All remaining errors are, of course, entirely my own.
See generay GRANT GILMoRE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
2 See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs

§ 92 (5th ed. 1984).
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II.

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PURPOSE OF CONTRACT
DAMAGES

In order to evaluate the common law's method of determining
when a claim sounds in tort instead of contract, it is important to
understand the purpose of contract damages.
In a world of perfect information and zero transaction costs,
parties would write complete contingent contracts. A complete contingent contract is one that provides an agreed-upon course of action for every possible future event that might influence the contract's subject matter.3 Such a contract would be Pareto efficient4 if
the parties could not make any changes such that both parties would
be better off." It is important to note that in a world with no transaction costs, any change that would make one party better off to a
greater degree than it made the other worse off would be adopted,
because the parties could then bargain costlessly over the net benefit
created by the alteration.6
In a Pareto efficient complete contingent contract, the parties
will contract for a penalty for breach that is sufficiently stiff to ensure
that neither party will ever breach.
Because the contract is complete, the parties will not be concerned about unforeseen events that
may change the value of performance. Ex ante, they will want to be
bound in such a way that breach will not occur." But note that a
complete contingent contract may provide that under certain circumstances, one or both parties need not perform.9
Contract damages are still necessary even with a Pareto efficient
complete contingent contract because the contract is only Pareto ef3 See Barry Perlstein, Crossing the Contract-Tort Boundary: An Economic Argument
for the Imposition of Extracompensatory Damages for Opportunistic Breach of Contract, 58
BRooK. L. REv. 877, 881 (1992); Steven Shavell, Damage Measuresfor Breach of Contract, 11 BELL.J. ECON. 466, 466 (1980).

A contract is Pareto efficient when no possible change in its terms could simultaneously make both parties better off. See Shavell, supranote 3, at 467.
5 Seeid.
6 SeeR.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1,
2-15 (1960); see also
Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms In Contract, 92 COLuM. L. REV. 997, 1000-04
(1992) (arguing that the goal of contract law is to maximize the joint expected return of the parties).
See Shavell, supra note 3,at 467.
8 See id.; see also generalyJohn H. Barton, The Economic Basis ofDamagesfor Breach
of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 291 (1972) (explaining that "when parties with
equal bargaining power negotiate about an equally understood risk or uncertainty,
the court can do no better from an economic viewpoint than to enforce their understanding....").
9 See Shavell, supra note 3, at 467 n.2.
4
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ficient ex ante. Once a particular contingency has occurred, the
agreed-upon outcome may no longer bring the highest returns for
both parties. For example, imagine a contract between a restaurant
owner (Owner) and a sailor (Sailor) for the supply of fish to the restaurant. Owner can sell the fish each day for $20. The damage to
Owner's reputation if she does not have fish to sell on any particular
day is $30. The cost to Sailor of catching the fish is $10 on a normal
day, but $16 if there is a storm. The chances of a storm are one in
ten. There are no other events that could affect the costs or values
to the two parties. A contract that provides for two possibilities-stormy weather and clear weather--will thus be a complete
contingent contract.
Owner suggests two possible complete contingent contracts to
Sailor. Under the first contract, Sailor must always supply Owner
with fish whether there is a storm or not. Under the second contract, Sailor will only supply Owner with fish when there is no storm;
on stormy days, Sailor will stay home. To induce Sailor to enter into
the first (Always Perform) contract, and thus avoid enormous damage to her reputation, Owner offers to pay a higher price for the fish
each day, $14. If Sailor chooses the second (Fair Weather Only) contract, Owner will only pay Sailor $11 each day for the fish, and will
pay nothing on stormy days.
Sailor would choose the first, Always Perform contract. To see
why this is so, we can calculate the value of each contract to both parties.
Always Perform contract:
Sailor (0.9)(14-10) + (0.1)(14-16) = 3.4
Owner. (0.9) (20-14) + (0.1) (20-14) = 6.0
Fair Weather Only contract:
Sailor (0.9)(11-10) + (0.1)(0) = 0.9
Owner (0.9)(20-11) + (0.1)(-30) = 5.1
Both parties clearly prefer the Always Perform option-it is Pareto optimal relative to the "fair weather only" contract. It is also the
dominant option-not only is it impossible to switch from the Always
Perform contract to the Fair Weather Only contract without making
one of the parties worse off, it is also impossible to do so without
making both parties worse off.
Under the Always Perform contract, however, Sailor would want
to breach the contract in the event of a storm. On stormy days,
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Sailor loses money because she bears costs of $16 but earns only $14.
Knowing that Sailor will breach once a storm arrives, Owner will refuse to offer the Always Perform contract ex ante. In order to allow
the parties to enter into the contract that they both prefer, they must
create some enforcement mechanism, such as contract damages,
even in this Pareto optimal, complete contingent contract.
In a world where information is costly, most contracts will no
longer be complete, either because of high transaction costs or because some contingencies are unverifiable. 0 One solution to this
problem is renegotiation. The background term in every contract
could be that if an unforeseen contingency arises, the parties will renegotiate the contract's terms under the new conditions. In the example above, Owner could offer Sailor between $17 and $20 to perform in a storm. Sailor will do so because this new price is higher
than the $16 that it will cost him to perform. Renegotiation thus
provides one method for achieving socially optimal solutions without
contract damages."
Renegotiation, however, can be costly. First, the time available
to agree on a new arrangement once the contingency materializes
may be insufficient. The contingency may occur immediately before
performance is due, or after it has begun, and the parties may not be
able to strike a new deal in time to prevent a breach. Second, renegotiation can change the balance of bargaining power, giving the
nonperforming party much greater leverage than she had in the
original negotiation. Particularly if the performance is time sensitive, the party that is to perform may be able to extort a much greater
share of the contract's net benefit from the party in need of performance. Third, the very process of renegotiation may be prohibitively expensive. For example, the parties may be far apart at the
time the unforeseen contingency occurs and perhaps unable to
reach one another to discuss new terms.
Another danger that can arise in the absence of contract damages is opportunism. Even when the parties have planned for the
contingency, in a nonsimultaneous contract the party that has not
yet performed may attempt to seize more of the contract's net bene-

10 See Shavell, supra note 3, at 468-69; see also StevenJ. Burton, Breach of Contract
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369, 393 (1980)
(discussing the costs of contract formation).
1 Of course, the parties could have also agreed to a special "storm price" in advance, but the initial assumption was that the parties were bargaining for a fixed
daily price.
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fits for herself. 2 The cost of the effort to achieve this reallocation is
a net social loss since its effect is only to redistribute existing income,
not increase the amount of income available to be distributed. In a
world without damages that relies only on renegotiation to deal with
unforeseen contingencies and opportunism, many socially beneficial
contracts will not be performed or will be performed at a higher social cost than necessary.
There are some non-damage mechanisms that may mitigate this
effect. To protect against breach, a party can either search for contracting partners who are less likely to breach, or can expend resources to monitor its contracting partners in order to detect imminent breaches." A party may also be deterred from breach by fear of
damage to its reputation; if it acquires a reputation as a dishonorable
4
partner, other parties may refuse to deal with it in the future. Alternatively, a party could charge a higher price to offset the effects of
anticipated breaches or could practice vertical integration to minimize the number of parties with whom it contracts. 5 Yet all of these
methods are cosdy'6 and may prove unsuccessful.
Searching for
"honorable" contracting partners, monitoring them, and researching
their reputations are all expensive activities. In addition, these
methods may not always be effective. Parties may be able to disguise
their dishonorable intentions, hide their incipient breaches, and disregard the negative impact on their reputations.
Another alternative is to impose some non-monetary penalty
upon breaching parties. A potential breacher could be deterred in
the same way potential criminals are--by the threat of some fixed
fine or imprisonment. This method might appeal to those who believe that it is morally wrong to break a contract, but this view is
clearly misguided. Few would argue that it is always wrong to break a
promise; unanticipated problems arise, new opportunities present
themselves, or conditions may otherwise change such that the assumptions behind the promise are no longer valid. When conditions have changed, it is sometimes acceptable even in social situations to go back on one's word. For example, I may promise to go to
12

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF lAw 89-92 (4th ed. 1992);

Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv.
521,521-26 (1981).
13 See Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory
Damages
for Breach of Contract,66 VA. L. REv. 1448, 1448 (1980).
14 See id. at 1464-65; see also Muris,
supranote 12, at 527.
1 See Muris, supra note 12, at 527.
16 SeeFarber, supra note 13,
at 1448.
17 See Muris, supranote 12, at 527-28.
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my friend's house for dinner tomorrow. When tomorrow arrives, I
may find that I have a 1040 fever. My friend will surely understand
when I tell her that I cannot come to dinner because I am ill. In
fact, she would probably be quite upset with me if I insisted on coming and risked infecting all of her guests. Similarly, in the commercial context, we should not rigidly bind parties to all of their promises. Because complete contingent contracts are not possible in the
real world, we want to allow some room for parties to avoid performance when new information is discovered, conditions have changed,
or better opportunities have arisen.
We can best provide this "wiggle room" by awarding damages for
breach of contract. A breach is socially desirable when the benefits
to the breaching party outweigh the costs to the performing party. 8
Any damages imposed must be great enough to prevent breaches
that cause a net social loss but small enough to allow efficient
breaches. Such a damage measure serves as a gap-filling device for
incomplete contracts; it creates incentives for the parties to behave
in the manner in which they would have agreed to behave had they
anticipated the contingency.9 Contract damages thus provide a solution for the problem of incomplete information. They also prevent opportunism, because by definition an opportunistic breach
creates a net social loss.
Damages should also be awarded for efficient breaches. Two rationales support this principle. First, the breaching party will only
make efficient decisions about whether or not to breach if she bears
the costs of the breach for both parties. Forcing the breaching party
to pay for any damages she causes gives her an incentive to maximize
the joint expected return of the contract to both parties---the objective of contract law generally.2 Second, allowing a party to breach
without paying damages would reallocate the risk of nonperformance. Parties usually intend to place the risk of nonperformance on
the performing party, at least in fixed price contracts. 2 ' Allowing the
performing party to breach with impunity when the breach is efficient would unfairly reassign the risk to the victim of nonperformance.
is See POSNER, supra note 12, at 119; see also Barton, supra note 8, at 282; Farber,
supra note 13, at 1443-44; John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in
Actions Based Upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33
UCLAL. REv. 1565, 1565-67 (1986).
19 See Shavell, supranote 3, at 468; see also POSNER, supra
note 12, at 92-93.
20 See Gergen, supra note 6, at 1000-04.
11 See POSNER, supra note 12, at 105.
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Judge Posner lists seven possible damage remedies for breach of
contract: reliance damages, expectation damages, liquidated damages, consequential damages, restitution, specific performance, and
punitive damages.2 Posner argues that the choice of an appropriate
remedy depends on whether or not the breach is opportunistic. If
the sole purpose of the promisor's breach is to take advantage of the
promisee's vulnerability by seizing a greater share of the net social
benefits of the contract, courts should feel free to "throw the book at
the promisor."2' Judge Posner believes that the best way to punish
the promisor is to award restitution damages, thereby confiscating
the promisor's profits and deterring the breach by making it worthless. 4 For non-opportunistic breaches, Posner advocates awarding
expectancy damages, which would give the promisee her expected
profits from the transaction.2 ' Expectancy damages would provide
the promisor with an incentive to perform unless a breach would be
efficient.2 6
Judge Posner's approach to opportunistic breaches is flawed,
and his method of dealing with non-opportunistic breaches may also
be problematic. That a breach is opportunistic should not affect the
damage measure. Opportunistic breaches are just one type of inefficient breach and should be treated the same as other breaches. The
purpose of a contractual damage measure is to provide the proper
incentives for the parties to perform by forcing them to absorb the
costs of nonperformance.2 A restitution measure of damages fails to
accomplish this goal. Under a restitution rule, the breaching party
must turn over the profits gained from breach, but this amount may
be either greater or less than the harm suffered by the promisee.
Only by sheer coincidence will this measure actually equal the total
damage caused to the promisee by the breach. As a result, the
promisor will either have too much or too little incentive to breach,
depending on the relationship between the promisor's profits from
breach and the damage caused to the promisee in each particular
case.
Posner's approach to non-opportunistic breaches is also problematic. Posner defines the expectancy measure as the promisee's

22

See id. at 117.

23

Id.

24
25

See id. at 117-18.
See id. at 118-26.

2

Seeid.
See Shavell, supranote 3, at 472.
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lost profits. 8 As discussed more thoroughly below, however, the
promisee's lost profits may be only a part of the total damage caused
by the breach. This measure fails to account for consequential damages and nonpecuniary losses, both of which may be significant. To
the extent the promisor is not forced to absorb these losses, she will
not make an efficient decision when considering whether or not to
breach.2

Professor Shavell defines expectancy more broadly as putting
the promisee in the position she would have been had the contract
been performed. Shavell has argued, however, that even under this
definition, expectancy is the best damage measure only under a relatively simple economic model of contracts." Once additional complications such as reliance expenditures are taken into account, it
becomes impossible to state as a general principle that expectancy is
superior to other measures such as reliance and restitution; the
proper measure becomes dependent on the nature of the particular
contract.'4
Since it is impossible to find a damage measure that both induces performance in all appropriate cases and provides the proper
incentives to invest in reliance expenditures, it becomes necessary to
choose which goal the law will pursue. Although this is fundamentally an empirical question, this article will assume that-overall-the
negative effects of causing or preventing breach at inappropriate
times swamp the effects of inducing an inefficient level of reliance.
This assumption seems reasonable. The reliance problem is
created by awarding the relying party full expectancy damages based
on her reliance expenditures at the time of breach. The relying
party is thus relieved of having to account for the possibility of
breach in determining her reliance level; the promisee knows that
even if the promisor breaches the contract, she will still receive her
expected return.

2

Ideally, the promisee would invest less in reliance

to account for the possibility that the promisor might breach. Yet
" See POSNER, supra note 12, at 117.
Throughout this article, I refer to breach as if it were purposeful. None of the
analysis, however, would change for negligent breach. A negligent breach is the
result of insufficient investment in care to prevent breach. Since parties must decide on the level of resources to invest in taking care, all breaches are in a sense
purposeful breaches. See infra Part VIII.C(2). In order to provide an incentive to
take an efficient level of care, the promisor must be acquainted with the full scope
of the harm caused by breach.
so See Shavell, supranote 3, at 472, 488.
S See id.
32 See id. at 472; see also POSNER, supranote 12,
at 122.
29
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because contracts are usually performed,"3 the ideal reduction in reliance expenditures is probably rather small and easily outweighed
by the negative impact of incorrectly inducing or preventing breach.
III. THE INADEQUACIES OF TRADITIONAL CONTRACT DAMAGES
If the goal of imposing damages for breach of contract is to
force the breaching party to internalize the full costs of her breach,
then traditional contract damages are inadequate. Traditional contract damages are sharply limited in a variety of ways: the foreseeability rule, the presumption against the award of nonpecuniary damages such as emotional distress, and the failure to account for
uncertainty in detecting breach. The net result of these limitations
is to under-deter breach. Because promisors will not have to pay for
all of the damage caused by their breach, they will breach even when
it is not efficient to do so.-"
A.

ConsequentialDamages

The foreseeability requirement limits the victim's damages in
both tort and contract law,' but the foreseeability rule is applied
more loosely in tort than in contract.' Tort victims are generally denied consequential damages only if "there was nothing in the situation to suggest to the most cautious mind" that the consequence
would occur.37 Victims of breach of contract, on the other hand, are
generally limited to damages "such as may reasonably be supposed to
have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they
made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.""
An award of all damages that resulted from a breach of contract
might result in disproportionately large damages for breach of a
relatively minor contract. This situation frequently arises in cases
dealing with misdelivered telegrams or telegrams containing some
error.39 Judges confronted with such cases often balk at the apparent

33 See Farber, supra note 13, at 1464.
See Linda Curtis, Note, Damage Measurements For Bad Faith Breach of Contract:
AnEconomicAnalysis, 39 STAN. L. REv. 161, 173 (1986); see alsoFarber, supranote 13,
at 1444-45; Sebert, supra note 18, at 1565-66.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965).
SeeSebert, supra note 18, at 1567 n.8 and accompanying text.
S7 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 841, 354, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
39 See Kerr Steamship Co. v. Radio Corp., 157 N.E. 140 (N.Y. 1927).
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inequity of awarding damages that can be thousands of times greater
than the actual value of the breached contract. 40
In the famous case of Hadley v. Baxendale, the court applied the
strict foreseeability rule in contract. In this case, a crank shaft broke
in Hadley's mill, preventing the mill from functioning. Hadley sent
the broken shaft to the manufacturer to have it fixed quickly, but the
carrier negligently delayed delivery, causing several days' lost profits
when the mill could not operate.' Hadley sued the carrier for lost
profits." The court refused to award Hadley consequential damages
because Hadley had not communicated to the carrier the special circumstances of this delivery and because "the loss of profits here cannot reasonably be considered such a consequence of the breach of
contract as could have been fairly and reasonably contemplated by
both the parties when they made this contract.""
The Hadley rule-that a promisor is not liable for consequential
damages not within the contemplation of the parties unless the special circumstances were communicated to the promisor by the promisee--has been universally adopted by the common law. 4 Some
courts have made the rule even stricter, refusing to award consequential damages even when the promisee communicated the possibility of unusual damages but where the promisor did not expressly
accept the greater scope of liability. For example, in Globe Refining
Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 47Justice Holmes wrote that "mere notice

to a seller of some interest or probable action of the buyer is not
enough necessarily and as a matter of law to charge the seller with
special damage on that account if he fails to deliver the goods.""
While the Hadley rule may be efficient for other reasons discussed below, the limits on consequential damages have the negative effect of
reducing the level of damages internalized by the breaching party
below that of the actual damages caused by the breach.

40

See Barton, supra note 8, at 295.

41 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).

See id. at 341.
See id. at 341-43.
See id. at 343.
45 Id. at 356.
See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability
for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284, 285
& n.2 (1991).
47 190 U.S. 540, 543, 545 (1903).
Id. at 545.
42
43
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B. Nonpecuniary Damages
Nonpecuniary damages, such as emotional distress, may also be
substantial. But traditional contract doctrine narrowly restricts a
party's ability to recover for emotional distress.49 Typically, emotional distress damages are only awarded in death and burial cases,;
in cases where the breach is accompanied by public embarrassment
of the promisee,"' or in cases where the breach results in physical
harm to the promisee, as in contracts for medical services. 2
Courts may be reluctant to award nonpecuniary damages because they are often unforeseeable, difficult to measure, or because
courts fear that awarding emotional distress damages would result in
a windfall to the plaintiff."3 The exceptions to this general rule occur
when these justifications are weak or nonexistent: when the contract
has a personal, rather than commercial aim, and when pecuniary
damages are so low that a refusal to award damages for emotional
distress would deprive the plaintiff of any compensation.5 Regardless of the rationale, the refusal of courts to award nonpecuniary
damages allows a potentially breaching promisor to disregard a substantial component of the promisee's damages in deciding whether
or not to breach.
C. Punitive Damages
The policy of disallowing punitive damages for breach of contract is based in large part on the assumption that all contract
breaches will be detected. 5 If all breaches are detected, and if all detections result in full compensation to the promisee, promisors will
be appropriately deterred from breach. If some percentage of
breaches is not discovered, though, promisors will discount their expected liability by the chance of escaping the penalty for breach. As
a result, to the extent that not all breaches are discovered, promisors
will be under-deterred from breaching contracts. Supercompensatory 0 damages could remedy this problem if courts awarded a
"multiple" 57 of the plaintiffs actual damages.
49

See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

353 (1981); see also Sebert, supra

note 18, at 1584-86.
so See Sebert, supra note 18, at 1585 & nn.66-67 and accompanying text.
51 See id. at 1585 & n.69.
52 See id. at 1585 &
nn.70-71.
s See id. at 1586-91.
U See id. at 1590.
See Curtis, supra note 34, at 166.
This article uses the term "supercompensatory" instead of "punitive" to em-
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The assumption of perfect detection may be reasonable in most
commercial contexts, but inaccurate in many consumer transactions.- Even in commercial contexts, detection of breach may be
costly or impossible, particularly for minor breaches.5 9 As a result,
the common-law policy against supercompensatory damages for
breach of contract may result in inadequate deterrence of breach.
IV. RATIONALE FOR TRADITIONAL CONTRACT DAMAGE RULES

Despite these flaws in traditional contract damages, there are
countervailing policies that argue against changing the common-law
rules in typical contract disputes.
A.

ConsequentialDamages

Although the failure to award consequential damages will often
create improper incentives to breach a contract, the Hadley doctrine
may be necessary in order to induce parties to disclose information
about the probable consequences of breach.6 Under Hadley, the
promisor is only liable for a consequence of breach if the promisee
has disclosed the consequence's possibility and the promisor has
agreed to assume the risk of its occurrence."
It will often be socially valuable for the promisor to know that
the promisee faces unusually large consequential damages should
the promisor breach. Without such knowledge, the promisor will
not be able to take into account the unexpectedly great social loss
that could result from breach when deciding whether a breach
would be efficient. Simply imposing liability for consequential damages will not create efficient incentives if the information costs associated with learning of the consequence are prohibitively high.
Moreover, the information costs for the promisor will generally be
higher than for the promisee, who is much more familiar with her
own business and thus more likely to know the consequences of a
phasize that the purpose of such damages should not be to punish--as under the
common law-but to remedy deterrence failures that stem from imperfect breach
detection. This article generally uses the term "punitive damages" only in referring
to the common-law doctrine.
57 This "multiple" would be calculated to compensate for the chance that the
breach would go undetected. For example, if a particular type of breach would be
detected only one-third of the time, the "multiple" would be set at three, and the
plaintiff would receive three times her compensatory damages.
See Curtis, supra note 34, at 166.
59 See Farber, supra note 13, at 1456.
See POSNER, supra note 12, at 127.
61 See id.; see also supra Part lI.A.
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breach by the promisor. In addition, a rule imposing liability for
consequential damages in all circumstances might actually discourage the promisee from disclosing her high consequential damages,
because a disclosure could result in a higher contract price reflecting
the greater expected liability.
Furthermore, the promisor may sometimes be the cheaper riskbearer because she may be in a better position to prevent breach or
may simply be less risk-averse. When the promisor is the cheaper
risk-bearer, it is socially desirable for the promisee to pay the promisor to assume the risk. The possibility for gains of trade 62 in this
situation already provides some incentive for the promisee to disclose the potential consequences of breach. But the promisee may
not be aware that the promisor is a cheaper risk-bearer, either because the promisee is unfamiliar with the promisor's level of risk
aversion or because the promisee does not know that the promisor
can take steps to reduce the risk of breach. The promisee may erroneously believe that the chances of the promisor being a cheaper
risk-bearer are too low to justify the costs of disclosing the necessary
information. Therefore, a rule that encourages disclosure may be
socially beneficial.
In some circumstances, the sharing of information may yield a
net social loss. The cost of transferring the information may exceed
the gains of trade, or there may not be any gains of trade. The cost
of sharing information may be quite large, especially for small, routine transactions such as sending a telegram where the information
transfer cost may exceed the price of the purchased service.
The Hadley rule encourages disclosure when sharing information would be socially beneficial but discourages disclosure when a
transfer of information would yield a net social loss. 63 The alternative
method, which would impose liability for consequential damages regardless of the level of disclosure, is inferior to the Had/ey rule in this
respect.
Application of the alternative method would result in one of two
possibilities. The first possibility is that no one will disclose any information about the possible consequences of a breach." In that
Gains of trade are possible when a bargain would make both parties better off.
For example, if A prefers apples, but only has an orange, and B prefers oranges, but
only has an apple, A and B could enjoy gains of trade by exchanging A's orange for
B's apple.
3 For a mathematical treatment of this point, see generally Bebchuk & Shavell,
supra note 46.
, See id. at 290-91.
6
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case, promisors will charge a higher average price to pay for their
expanded liability and will not take the efficient level of precaution.
The second possibility is that promisees will only reveal the possibility of consequential damages when a breach would not cause an unusually high consequential damage award.66 Situations with a potential for unusually high consequential damages will occur relatively
infrequently,7 or else the consequences would not be sufficiently
unusual to fall outside the Hadley test-common consequences are
generally "supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties."" Therefore, this outcome is less efficient because it requires
more parties to spend resources to reveal information about consequential damages.
The negative effects of the Hadley rule on incentives to breach a
contract may be eliminated by the parties' capability to reveal the
likelihood of unusually high consequential damages. Once this information is disclosed and the risk's assignment is negotiated, the
party best able to avoid the loss will bear its risk. To the extent that
the benefits of communication outweigh the costs, this rule is superior to the alternative rule of full liability for consequential damages.
B. Nonpecuniary Damages
Allowing plaintiffs to recover nonpecuniary damages such as
emotional distress for breach of contract would risk runaway jury
verdicts, inhibit commercial transactions, and increase uncertainty
for contracting parties. There is a substantial chance that juries will
use a vague category such as emotional distress as a "back-door"
method of awarding punitive damages. 0 Because nonpecuniary
damages are so difficult to measure objectively, it may be difficult for
courts to prevent this from occurring.7
id.
Seeid.
67 See id. at 289.
68 Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 354, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
69 See Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 46, at 291-92. But see Sandra Chutorian,
Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L.
Rav. 377, 402-06 (1986) (arguing for expanded consequential damages in contract); Curtis, supra note 34, at 162-63 (arguing a similar position); Jeffrey M. Perloff, Breach of Contract and the Foreseeability Doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale, 10 J.
LEGAL STUD. 39, 62-63 (1981) (arguing that neither rule necessarily leads to an optimal outcome if people are risk averse).
70 SeSebert, supra note
18, at 1598-99.
71 But see id. at 1654-56 (arguing that the use of devices such as a higher
burden
65See

6
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Awarding nonpecuniary damages could also inhibit commercial
transactions. Parties may be more reluctant to enter into transactions knowing that they could face liability for large nonpecuniary
losses if they breached the contract. Increasing the expected damages for breach would reduce the expected value of the transaction
and commensurately reduce parties' willingness to commit themselves to a contract. If there were some objective method of measuring nonpecuniary losses so that juries could award them accurately
and parties could predict them with certainty, then forcing parties to
take nonpecuniary losses into account would be socially beneficial
for the reasons described above. But because there is so much uncertainty surrounding estimates of nonpecuniary losses, it is unlikely
that juries would award the actual loss suffered by the promisee. The
effect of awarding emotional distress damages might be the addition
of a random "lottery" factor instead of an increase in the accuracy of
deterring breach. This uncertainty becomes even more problematic
once risk aversion is taken into account. Parties who would be relatively risk-neutral when faced with limited damages for breach may
become more risk-averse when faced with expanded liability. Even a
small chance of a disproportionately large nonpecuniary loss award
could deter parties from entering into socially beneficial transactions.
Emotional distress is a real social harm that may result from
breach of contract. But the problems involved in measuring it accurately, because of plaintiffs' incentives to exaggerate their losses and
because there is no market for emotional distress, may cause so
much distortion that the net effect of adding this element to damages would be to reduce the accuracy of deterring breach.
C. PunitiveDamages
Punitive damages are generally not awarded for breach of contract. Parties should be free to decide between performing or paying
damages for nonperformance. As Justice Holmes said, "The duty to
keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must
pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else."72 Punitive
damages are considered inappropriate in contract cases because7' they
would deter efficient breaches, thereby causing a net social loss.

of proof could effectively control juries' impulses to overaward nonpecuniary damages).
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 ILARv. L. REv. 457, 462
(1897).
73 See Curtis, supra note 34, at 165.
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As explained in Part III.C above, supercompensatory damages
designed to compensate parties for the reduction in deterrence from
uncertain detection of breach would not be subject to this critique.
Such damages only restore the proper level of deterrence by making
up for the fact that breaches are not always detected. These damages
give potential breachers the same deterrence incentives they would
have if all breaches were detected.
There are, however, other reasons to deny plaintiffs supercompensatory damages. First, the efficacy of supercompensatory damages in deterring breach efficiently depends on the factfinder's ability to estimate accurately the chances of breach detection in
particular cases. The question will only arise in cases where the
breach was detected. As a rule, the factfinder will not have statistics
available to prove how often the breach goes undetected in similar
cases. The factfinder's estimate will be little more than a guess in
most cases, based on circumstances that seem to point either towards
or away from easy detection of the breach. This will create a great
deal of uncertainty for transacting parties.
Second, the lack of objective guidance in setting a "multiple" to
account for lapses in detection may lead judges and juries to substitute their own emotions about the degree to which the promisor
should be punished for the chance of breach detection. This tendency would result in awarding punitive damages for breach of contract, deterring efficient breaches, and creating a net social loss.
Third, in cases where a breach is particularly hard to detect but
where the promisor's breach was not malicious, factfinders may be
reluctant to award the full "multiple." It will no doubt appear highly
inequitable to force a breaching but well-intentioned promisor to
pay many times the actual damage simply because the breach was difficult to detect. For these cases, the attempt to provide the efficient
level of deterrence through supercompensatory damages may be
foiled byjudge and jury nullification.
Fourth, supercompensatory damages would encourage parties
to overinvest in monitoring costs in the hopes of acquiring a windfall. Promisees would also be more likely to bring suit, even where
their chances of success on the merits would not otherwise warrant
paying litigation costs. This problem might be addressed by having
the promisor pay the supercompensatory damages to the court,
rather than the promisee. This would eliminate the promisee's incentive to overspend on either monitoring or litigation. However,
the problems of uncertainty, jury nullification, and inaccuracy in as-
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sessing the "multiple" all argue against awarding supercompensatory
damages.
D. Conclusion
Despite the effect that deficiencies in contract damages have on
the promisor's incentive to breach, most of the problematic doctrinal rules are justified by other policies.
V. EFFECT OF ATTACHING A TORT CLAIM
Attaching a tort claim to a breach of contract action dramatically alters the rules governing damages. First, tort claims are often
governed by a different standard of liability.74 While strict liability
generally applies to contract claims, most tort claims are governed by
some sort of fault standard, although strict liability does apply to
some types of tort cases."
Second, tort ?laintiffs are eligible for a greater scope of consequential damages. 6 As in contract, foreseeability plays a role in tort
damages.77 But the foreseeability test is applied more loosely in tort
than in contract.78 In tort, the foreseeability test is applied from the
time of the injury, looking backwards.7 9 In contract, the focus is on
the time the agreement was made; defendants are only liable for
consequential damages within the contemplation of the parties at
the time of contract formation.8 Because the focus in tort is closer
in time, consequential damages are generally more foreseeable than
in contract cases.
Third, tort plaintiffs who have suffered some physical injury can
receive emotional distress damages."' Emotional distress damages
are not generally recoverable for breach of contract.8 This distinction, however, is not always strictly observed. In a recent California

74 See Thomas C. Galligan,Jr., ContortionsAlong the Bounday Between Contracts
and
Torts, 69 TUL. L. REv. 457, 463 (1994).

75 See id.
76 See id. at 465-69.
77 See id.

78 See/id.
79 See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 cmt. b (1965).
80 See Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 46, at 284-85.

8, See Galligan, supranote 74, at 469-70; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 12,
at 55.

See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CoNTrACrs § 12.17, at 274-76
(1990); see also Galligan, supranote 74, at 471.
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case, the court ordered the builder of a defective house to pay the
owner emotional distress damages.
Fourth, courts may award tort plaintiffs Xunitive damages if the
harm was caused intentionally or recklessly. In contract, punitive
damages are not generally available unless the defendant's conduct
in breaching the contract also violated a noncontractual legal duty,
thereby constituting a tort.'
Attaching a tort claim to a breach of contract action expands
the scope of damages available to the plaintiff and solves many of the
incentive problems discussed above. The promisor may face liability
for consequential damages and emotional distress, and may be implicitly assigned liability for a low chance of detection through punitive damages. As discussed above, however, there are good reasons
for avoiding this type of solution in the typical contract case.
VI. THE COMMON-LAW TEST FOR ATTACHING A TORT CLAIM
The common law allows a plaintiff to sue in tort for a contract
dispute only if the defendant's conduct constituted a separate and
independent tort.6 Courts generally allow tort claims arising out of
contractual relationships for independent torts such as fraud, breach
of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
negligence in personal injury. The rationale for allowing independent tort claims is that the form of the pleadings should not be allowed to dictate the type of relief awarded. 7 A claim should not be
evaluated as a contract claim just because one of the parties describes it that way; claims should be dealt with in a manner consistent
with their true nature. As the Supreme Court of Nebraska has written, "Whether an action is characterized as one in tort or on contract
is determined by the nature of the complaint, not by the form of the
pleadings, and consideration must be given to the facts which constitute the cause of action.""
Although this test appears straightforward, it has proven difficult to apply. Courts have developed different subsidiary rules for
determining whether a claim sounds in contract or tort. Some
courts have held that there must be a separate set of facts from those
8
See Galligan, supra note 74, at 471 (citing Salka v. Dean Homes of Beverly
Hills, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902 (Ct. App. 1993)).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 908 (1979).

See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981).
SSee id.; see aloFARNSWORTH, supranote 82, § 12.8, at 191-92.

See Sebert, supra note 18, at 1601.
a Thomas v. Countryside of Hastings, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Neb. 1994).
87
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forming the basis of the contract claim in order for a plaintiff to sue
in tort as well. Under this approach, there is a preference for interpreting causes of action as sounding in contract. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska adopted this approach in Cimino v. FirsTierBank"
In that case, the court wrote:
We hold that even if the Ciminos stated facts sufficient to establish that FirsTier owed them a fiduciary duty, intentionally interfered with the Ciminos' contractual relations, and made material
misrepresentations, the Ciminos failed to plead those theories as
independent tort actions ....
The Ciminos failed to allege any
separate and distinct factual occurrences that could stand alone
as a separate cause of action sounding in tort.
Other courts have applied a looser test, allowing the plaintiff to
choose between suing in tort or contract if the same set of facts
could support either type of claim. The Supreme Court of Utah
adopted this approach in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association 9'
Ward dealt with a crop owner who was suing a farmers association for
spraying the wrong type of chemicals on his crops. The court held
that the plaintiff had the option of suing for breach of contract or in
tort, whichever claim seemed most advantageous to him. The court
justified its position by citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts- "'An
act and its consequences may be both a tort and a breach of contract .... When this is so, the injured person, although barred by a
statute from maintaining an action of tort may not be barred from
enforcing his contractual ... right or vice versa....
Courts are also split between those that examine the nature of
the duty violated and those that examine the nature of the loss in
order to determine if a cause of action sounds in contract or in tort.
West Virginia followed the first approach in Silk v. Flat Top Construction, Inc." In Silk, a homeowner sued a consultant whom the owner
had hired to oversee the construction of a new house.9 4 The construction was completed late and at considerably greater expense
than agreed to in the contract.!5 The court held that the consultant
was liable only in contract, not in tort. 0 The court wrote, "Tort law is
not designed ...to compensate parties for losses suffered as a result

90
91

530 N.W.2d 606 (Neb. 1995).
Id. at613.
907 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1995).

Id. at 267 n.2 (quoting

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

453 S.E.2d 356 (W. Va. 1994).
9
See id. at 357-58.
95 See id. at 358.
9
See id. at 360.
93

§ 899 cmt. b (1979)).
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of a breach of duties assumed only by agreement .... 'The controlling policy consideration underlying the law of contracts is the protection of expectations bargained for.'"97 Because the consultant had
only violated his contractual duty, and not some common-law duty of
care, the plaintiff could sue only in contract.9"
The second approach was followed by the Maryland Court of
Appeals in United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore." In this case,
the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore sued a building-materials
manufacturer because the materials they had purchased from the
manufacturer contained asbestos.1" The court held that "a purchaser suffering only economic loss because of a defective product
will normally be limited to contract causes of action, including
breach of implied and express warranties .

. . ."

Yet the court al-

lowed a tort action in this case because the defect created "a substantial and unreasonable risk of personal injury."112 The case hinged on

the nature of the injury, not the nature of the duty owed by the
manufacturer to the city.
The Texas Supreme Court has also applied this test. In Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed,'0 3 the plaintiff sued in tort for deceptive trade
practices and gross negligence in connection with the faulty construction of a house. T0 In holding that the plaintiff was limited to a
suit for breach of contract, the Texas Supreme Court wrote:
Although the principles of contract and tort causes of action are
well settled, often it is difficult in practice to determine the type
of action that is brought. We must look to the substance of the
cause of action and not necessarily the manner in which it was
pleaded ....The nature of the injury most often determines
which duty or duties are breached. When the injury is only the
Id. at 360 (citations omitted).
See id. at 86; see also Department of Natural Resources v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 856 P.2d 766, 772-77 (Alaska 1993) (employing nature of the duty

violated test); Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. National Bank of Arkansas, 870
S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Ark. 1994) (holding that the test is whether the "gist of the action" sounds in contract or tort); Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd.,
869 P.2d 454, 460-64 (Cal. 1994) (using same test); Vickers v. Hanover Constr. Co.,
875 P.2d 929, 982-33 (Idaho 1994) (employing nature of the duty violated test);

Roger v. Dufrene, 613 So. 2d 947, 948 (La. 1993) (applying same test); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Butch Lewis Prods., Inc., 862 P.2d 1207, 1209-10 (Nev. 1993) (applying
nature of the duty test).
647 A.2d 405 (Md. 1994).
100 See id. at 408.
101 Id. at 410.
102 Id. at411.

'0'711 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1986).
10 Seeid. at617.

410

SETON HALL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 28:390

economic loss to the
10 5 subject of a contract itself, the action sounds
in contract alone.
Some courts have attempted to apply both tests simultaneously,
without acknowledging that the tests may produce different results.
JBC of Wyoming Corp. v. Cheyenne" dealt with a contractor suing a city
and a board of public utilities because the city had not made timely
payments under a construction contract. The court rejected the
contractor's attempt to add a tort claim, applying both a "nature of
the injury" test and a "nature of the duty" test.'
The court wrote,
"Tort recovery based on the contractual relationship should only be
allowed where breach constitutes an independent injury over and
above disappointment of the plaintiffs expectation interest ....
[T]ort liability can only be premised on a duty independent of contractual duties."'Os
The Texas Supreme Court also applied both tests in a recent
case. In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. DeLanney,'O' the plaintiff
sued Southwestern Bell for damages resulting from Bell's failure to
publish DeLanney's Yellow Pages advertisement. " The court applied both the "nature of the duty" test and the "nature of the injury"
test in determining that DeLanney's claim sounded only in contract."' The court wrote, "In determining whether the plaintiff may
recover on a tort theory, it is also instructive to examine the nature
of the plaintiff's loss. When the only loss or damage is to the subject
matter of the contract, the plaintiff's action is ordinarily on the contract."1 2 The court went on to say:
Bell's duty to publish DeLanney's advertisement arose solely from
the contract. DeLanney's damages, lost profits, were only for the
economic loss caused by Bell's failure to perform. Although DeLanney pleaded his action as one in negligence, he clearly sought
to recover the benefit of his bargain with Bell. We hold that
Bell's failure to publish the advertisement was not a tort. Under
our analysis in Reed, DeLanney's claim was solely in contract.'
The court's reference to the source of Bell's duty indicates reliance on the "nature of the duty" test, but the court also explicitly
105

Id. at 617-18 (citations omitted).

"6
843 P.2d 1190 (Wyo. 1992).
107 Id.

at 1197.

108 Id.
9 809 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1991).
"o Se id. at 493-94.

III Id. at 494.
112

Id.
1S Id. at 495 (footnote omitted).
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stated the "nature of the injury" test."" The court did not acknowledge that the two tests might produce different results and did not
attempt to state a rule as to which test would govern when they were
in conflict.
It is easy to see that the tests might, in fact, produce different
results. Suppose Builder contacts Owner and proposes to build an
office park on Owner's tract of land. Owner, having heard horror
stories about the problems of dealing with inexperienced builders,
questions Builder closely as to Builder's experience constructing office parks. Builder assures Owner that she personally has participated in the design and construction of more than a dozen office
parks, and that her company, Builders, Inc., has built more than
thirty such parks. In fact, Builder has never built a thing in her life,
and her company has just been formed three days earlier.
Owner, persuaded by Builder's eloquent testimonial, enters into
a contract with Builder to construct an office park on her land.
Three years and several million dollars later, the office park is nothing but a gaping hole in the middle of Owner's land. Owner finally
researches Builder's background, learns of the deception, and sues
Builder for fraud.
Under the "nature of the duty" test, Builder is liable in tort to
Owner. Builder's duty to tell the truth was imposed by law, not by
the contract to build the park. But under the "nature of the injury"
test, Builder is liable only in contract. Owner is suing for her expectancy, the value of the office park had it been built correctly and
within budget. These are typical contract damages, so Owner's suit
sounds in contract.
Even when courts choose to apply only one of these two tests,
they still encounter difficulties. Some cases are easy. For example,
if, in the scenario above, Builder had punched Owner in a fit of rage
at having been discovered, Owner would surely have a claim in tort.
Owner's claim clearly passes both the "nature of the duty" (the law,
not a contract, prohibits Builder from hitting people) and the
"nature of the injury" (Owner is suing for her pain and suffering and
medical expenses as a result of her bloody nose) tests. The contractual relationship between Builder and Owner is irrelevant. When the
injury is more closely related to the underlying contract, however,
courts often have a tougher time figuring out whether the claim
sounds in contract or tort. The torts that present the most difficult
cases are bad faith, fraud, and negligence.

114

Id. at 494.
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VII. A RECOMMENDATION FOR A DIFFERENT COMMON-LAW TEST
The common-law test may result in less than optimal policy
choices because the connection between doctrine and policy is only
indirect. The search for an independent tort acts as an imperfect
proxy for determining how the policies behind contract damage
limitations apply to the types of situations in which various torts
arise. For example, as discussed below, the many cases that uphold a
tort cause of action for promissory fraud" 5 -"a promise to perform
made at a time when the promisor has a present intention not to
perform " -are misguided.
A better approach would be to determine whether the assumptions underlying the normal contract damage limitations are weakened by the commission of various types of tort-like acts. Courts
should examine each of the torts commonly attached to breach of
contract actions to determine whether the normal rationale for limiting contract damages applies. When this rationale seems weak for a
particular type of "contort," courts should make some or all of the
more expansive tort remedies available. This approach represents an
improvement over the common-law test because it targets the precise
policy question at issue instead of using some rule of thumb whose
results only roughly approximate the optimal.
The type of case in which the "contort" arises may also be relevant. For a particular "contort," the assumptions underlying contract
damage limitations may be stronger in some contexts than in others.
This may be true because of the nature of the parties' relationship,
the complexity of the contract, the sophistication of the parties, or
because any other trait of a particular case category affects the validity of these assumptions. Because the plaintiffs liability theory already takes into account many of the case's pertinent characteristics,
the examination of the case's context will most likely prove to be of
secondary importance compared to the nature of the "contort."
Nevertheless, a case's context will sometimes prove to be an important "second-level" consideration.

1 See, e.g., Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3, 9 (Ala. 1997);
Lusk Corp. v. Burgess, 332 P.2d 493, 495 (Ariz. 1958); Lazar v. Superior Ct., 909
P.2d 981, 985 (Cal. 1996); Abort v. Abott, 195 N.W.2d 204, 209 (Neb. 1972); Sproul
v. Fossi, 548 P.2d 970, 972-73 (Or. 1976). But see Steinberg v. Chicago Med. Sch.,
371 N.E.2d 634, 641 (Ill. 1977) (declining to recognize a cause of action for promissory fraud).
1
BLACK's LAwDIcnoNARy 1214 (6th ed. 1990).
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ConsequentialDamages

The Hadley rule should be reversed in cases where the promisor,
not the promisee, has more information about the promisee's likely
consequential damages. The Hadley rule forces the promisee to disclose the information that she alone possesses only when it is efficient for her to do so-when the benefits of disclosure from reallocation of the risk outweigh the costs of disclosure. Yet the same
principle ought to apply to those cases in which the promisor actually has more information about the promisee's likely consequential
damages than does the promisee. This might occur when the
promisor is an expert of some sort who knows the likely result of her
failure to complete performance."'

For example, suppose Owner contracts with Plumber to fix
Owner's water heater. Owner knows nothing about water heaters,
but she does know that hers is not working properly. Plumber is a
water heater expert, and she knows that some water heater malfunc-

tions can eventually cause them to explode. In this hypothetical, it is
the promisor, Plumber, who possesses important information about

Owner's likely consequential damages from Plumber's failure to perform. Only Plumber knows that if she does not fix the water heater,
it may explode, destroying Owner's house. It is true that Owner better knows the house's value and contents, but she has no way of
knowing that this information should be disclosed because she is
completely unaware that her property is at risk.
Under the Hadley contract liability rule, Plumber would probably not be liable for the damaged house. As discussed in Part III.A,
unless the promisee has at least notified the promisor of likely unusual consequences of breach, the promisor is only liable for dam-

ages that "may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the
probable result of the breach of it."" 8 Owner probably anticipated
that if Plumber failed to fix the water heater, she would suffer a furSome statements of the foreseeability doctrine in contract law could be interpreted as endorsing this idea. Judge Richard Posner, for example, has written:
The general principle is that if a risk of loss is known to only one party
to the contract, the other party is not liable for the loss if it occurs.
This principle induces the party with knowledge of the risk either to
take appropriate precautions himself, or, if he believes that the other
party might be the more efficient preventer or spreader (insurer) of
the loss, to reveal the risk to that party and pay him to assume it.
1

POSNER, supra note 12, at 127.

1 Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 354, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) (emphasis
added).
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ther loss of hot water. She may even have contemplated some damage to the water heater itself, but Owner certainly would not have
11
contemplated that her house might be destroyed.
In this situation, we would like to encourage Plumber either to
reveal the danger to Owner, so that she may arrange for a backup
plumber if necessary, or to take sufficient action to prevent the potential explosion. We can provide Plumber with the proper incentives to do so by making her liable for the consequences of the explosion, that is, the value of the house and its contents, whenever she
both fails to prevent the harm and neglects to tell Owner about the
danger. The proposed modified Hadley rule, making the promisor
liable for consequential damages that she was in a better position to
anticipate, will achieve this end.
B.

NonpecuniaryDamages

The assumptions behind the rule barring nonpecuniary damages for breach of contract are weaker when a breach is likely to
cause physical injury or when the subject of the contract has great
emotional significance, such as a wedding or a funeral.
As discussed in Part IV.B, the primary rationale for refusing to
award nonpecuniary damages in breach of contract cases was that
such damages are extremely difficult to anticipate or to measure in
the typical commercial contract setting. In a business environment,
it is usually assumed that people are not emotionally involved in
their contracts and so will not suffer emotional distress from a party's
nonperformance or misperformance of the agreed-upon terms. Because this assumption will usually turn out to be correct, the cost of
investigating the temperament of one's contracting partners in order
to take such damages into account would almost certainly outweigh
any benefit derived from more accurate breach decisions.
These concerns are reduced when the existence of nonpecuniary damages is more predictable from the outset. Parties entering
into contracts that deal with topics of great emotional significance
can more easily anticipate the likelihood of emotional distress resulting from their nonperformance. Similarly, a party who enters into a
contract where nonperformance is likely to cause personal injury
119 Plumber probably would be liable under tort foreseeability rules.

As dis-

cussed in Part III.A, compensation for tort victims is only limited by what "the most
cautious mind" might suspect would result from the tort. See supra Part III.A; see also
Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). In this scenario, "the
most cautious mind" would surely have known that defective water heaters sometimes explode, so that Plumber would be liable under tort rules.
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should be able to take the potentially injured party's pain and suffering into account as a likely consequence of breach. Under circumstances such as these, when nonpecuniary damages as a result of
breach are the norm rather than the exception, the existence of
such damages can be easily anticipated and nonpecuniary damages
should be included as a remedy for breach.
Even when the existence of nonpecuniary damages is more certain, measuring such damages remains difficult and unpredictable.
The measurement problem might be remedied in many cases by including a contract term providing the amount of nonpecuniary
damages to be awarded in the event of breach. For some contracts,
however, agreeing on the nonpecuniary damage award in advance
will not be feasible. It is probably unrealistic to imagine that parties
will bother with such terms for contracts that are too small to be negotiated, or where nonpecuniary damages are unexpected by both
parties. For these categories of contracts, courts must make an empirical judgment about whether the problems stemming from the
unpredictability of the amount of nonpecuniary damages outweigh
any distortions in breach decisionmaking that are caused by allowing
breaching parties to avoid paying nonpecuniary damages. When
nonpecuniary damages are unexpected, it is unlikely that forcing the
breaching party to pay for them could have any deterrent effect on
future similarly-situated contracting parties. Yet for small contracts
where such damages are predictable, the imposition of nonpecuniary damages might well tip the balance away from breach in appropriate cases.
C. SupercompensatoryDamages

Supercompensatory damages should be awarded for breach of
contract in cases where the chances of breach detection are particularly low or where the chances of detection can be calculated with
some accuracy.
As explained in Part IV.C, supercompensatory damages are only
justified for breach of contract as a method of boosting deterrence
where deterrence levels would otherwise be inefficiently low because
of uncertain breach detection. The policy against awarding supercompensatory damages in most cases is justified primarily by the difficulty of determining the appropriate number by which to multiply
the actual damages in order to calculate the correct amount of punitive damages. This "punitive multiple" will be inversely related to the
chance of breach detection. That is, when the chance of breach detection is high, the "multiple" will be low because deterrence will al-
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ready be near efficient levels; when the chance of breach detection is
low, the "multiple" will be high because too many breachers are able
to avoid performance without cost.
When the "punitive multiple" is known to be high but is difficult
to calculate with any precision, the award of some supercompensatory damages is warranted. Courts should be conservative in determining the "multiple," both because of the incentive problems
caused by high levels of supercompensatory damages and because of
the risk of supercompensatory damages being used to punish rather
than to deter. But when the "multiple" is known to be high, the risk
that the jury or the court will award too much money in supercompensatory damages is lower. Similarly, when it is possible to calculate
the "punitive multiple" with a fair degree of accuracy, the risk that
too much money will be awarded in supercompensatory damages out
of a desire to punish the breacher is reduced. In either circumstance, supercompensatory damages should be awarded to compensate for the weakness in deterrence caused by a less than certain
chance of breach detection.
VIII. PRELIMINARY APPLICATIONS OF THE NEW TEST

A thorough analysis of even one of the "borderline" torts would
be an appropriate subject for an entire article. In order to illustrate
the application of the proposed test, however, this section will (1)
briefly examine how the common law has dealt with some of the
more commonly raised "contorts" and (2) sketch out an argument
based on the proposed test for any appropriate changes.
Bad Faith

A.

1. Background
The Uniform Commercial Code imposes a duty of good faith
and fair dealing on all contracts covered by the U.C.C.'21 Many states
also impose the duty on parties to contracts not covered by the
U.C.C.12 ' The U.C.C. defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the

conduct or transaction concerned. " 22 In most contexts, this duty is

See U.C.C. § 1-203.
121 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); see also Burton, supra
note 10, at 369; Perlstein, supra note 3, at 890.
120

1

U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1989).
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imposed as a nonwaivable
contract term, enforceable by normal con23
rules.
damage
tract
Some courts, in certain contexts, have awarded tort remedies for
the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 2 4 Courts have
most commonly awarded tort damages for a breach of the duty of
good faith in cases involving first-party and third-party insurance
claims.
The California Supreme Court first recognized that a breach of
the duty could be a tort in the insurance context in Comunale v. Traders & GeneralInsurance Co." 3 This case dealt with a third-party insurance claim-a suit by someone other than the insurer or the insured,
who is not a party to the insurance contract."3 The court held that
the duty of good faith and fair dealing required an insurer to settle
with the plaintiff suing the insured whenever it made sense to do so
from the insured's perspective.'2 The court awarded the insured tort
damages for the insurer's failure to comply with this standard.'28 In
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,'" the court went even further, suggesting in dicta that an insurer breached the duty of good faith whenever
it refused to settle a case against an insured for an amount within the
policy limits."
The California Supreme Court extended the tort treatment of
breaches of good faith to the first-party insurance context-suits by
the insured against the insurer-in Gruenbergv. Aetna Insurance Co.,"
Silberg v. California Lfe Insurance Co.,1 32 Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 3 and Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co."' In these cases,
the court held that an insurer would be liable in tort whenever it denied an insured's claim that it knew to be valid or denied an insured's claim without an adequate investigation.' "
See MatthewJ. Barrett, 'Contort": Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance, Commercial Contracts--Its Existence and Desirability, 60 NOTREDAMEL. REv. 510, 524 (1985).
13

125

See id. at 525 & n.89.
328 P.2d 198, 202 (Cal. 1958).

12

See id. at 200.

12

See id. at 201.

124

See id. at 202.
426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
IS See id. at 176-77.
13'
510 P.2d 1032, 1040 (Cal. 1973) (en banc).
112 521 P.2d 1108, 1108-09 (Cal. 1974) (en banc).
133
13
133

582 P.2d 980, 985-86 (Cal. 1978).
620 P.2d 141, 144-45 (Cal. 1979) (en banc).
See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 144-46 (Cal. 1979) (en

banc); see also Nea4 582 P.2d at 985 & n.4; Silberg,521 P.2d at 1108-09; Gruenberg,510
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Since Comunale, many other states have adopted the California
Supreme Court's policy of awarding tort damages for breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing in third-party or first-party insurance contexts.136 Some states have refused to do so, 37 and others
have allowed tort damages for third-party insurance cases but not for
first-party claims. '"
There is a conflict of interest between the insured and insurer
that results from the existence of policy limits in insurance contracts.
In a third-party insurance case, before trial, the insurer has different
incentives to settle the case than does the insured. To illustrate,
suppose the plaintiff has a fifty percent chance of winning $2000 at
trial and a fifty percent chance of winning nothing. The expected
value of the plaintiffs claim is then $1000, and the insurer and insured together should be willing to settle for $1000 or less, assuming
all parties are risk-neutral. If the insurance policy has a limit of
$1000, however, the insurer's expected payment will be less than the
plaintiff's expected value. This is true because if the plaintiff obtains
a judgment for $2000, the insurer will only have to pay $1000. As a
result, the expected cost of the plaintiffs suit to the insurer is only
$500-the probability of the plaintiff winning at trial multiplied by
the amount of the judgment for which the insurer is contractually
liable. The case may thus go to trial even though, if the insurer's interests were identical to those of the insured, the matter would settle.
In this example, if the insurer's and insured's interests were somehow aligned-because the insurance policy contained a higher limit,
for instance-both sides should be willing to settle for the case's expected value, $1000.
Proponents of allowing tort damages in the insurance context
argue that the insurer is in a quasi-fiduciary relationship with the insured because, in most policies, the insured has agreed to allow the
insurer to decide whether to settle or litigate." 9 Such proponents
contend that the combination of the quasi-fiduciary relationship, the
strong potential for a conflict of interest, and the disparity in information and bargaining power in contracts of adhesion create a
"special relationship" between the insurer and its insured.' 40 Courts
P.2d at 1037-38.
1S6 SeSebert, supra note 18, at 1613-14
& n.178.
137 See id. at 1614 & n.179.
138 See id. at 1614-15 & n.180.
1s9 See Alan 0. Sykes, JudicialLimitations on the Discretionof Liability Insurers to Settle
orLitigate: An Economic Critique, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1345, 1345-46 (1994).
140 See Sebert, supra note 18, at 1639-40; see also Michael H. Cohen, Comment,
ReconstructingBreach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing as a Tort, 73
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have pointed to this special relationship as the rationale for awarding
tort damages for a breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
1
in insurance contracts.
Some courts have expanded the award of tort damages for
breach of the duty of good faith to other contexts where a similar
"special relationship" exists, such as employment and banking contracts.'42 In Wallis v Superior Court," a California court extended tort
damages to employer-employee relationships. That court described
"special relationships" as containing five characteristics:
(1) the contract must be such that the parties are in inherently
unequal bargaining positions; (2) the motivation for entering
the contract must be a non-profit motivation, i.e., to secure peace
of mind, security, future protection; (3) ordinary contract damages are not adequate because (a) they do not require the party
in the superior position to account for its actions, and (b) they do
not make the inferior party "whole"; (4) one party is especially
vulnerable because of the type of harm it may suffer and of necessity places trust in the other party to perform; and (5) the
other party is aware of this vulnerability.'"
The court found such a special relationship in the employment context and held that the employer could be liable in tort for violating
the duty of good faith." 5
The tort of breach of good faith was applied in the banking
context in Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank'46 In this
case, a California court found that a special relationship existed between banks and their depositors that warranted the application of
tort damages
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deal1 7
4
ing.
The tort of bad faith breach of contract reached its apex in Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil'" In Seaman's, the California Supreme Court considered and rejected a general tort of bad
REv. 1291, 1292-93 (1985).
See Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 576 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc); see also
Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 146-47 (Cal. 1979) (en banc);
Stephens v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 852 P.2d 565, 567-68 (Mont. 1993); Christian v.
American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 904-05 (Okla. 1978).
1
See Cohen, supra note 140, at 1298-99.
"'
207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Ct. App. 1984).
CAL.L.
1

141

Id. at 129.
See id. at 129-30.

146

209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Ct. App. 1985).

'4

4
148

See id. at 554.
686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984) (en banc), overru/ed by Freeman & Mills, Inc. v.

Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 679-80 (Cal. 1995).
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faith breach of contract. 49 The court, however, did recognize a tort
of bad faith denial of the existence of the defendant's liability under
a contract. 15° In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Byrd wrote that a
breach of a normal commercial contract could be tortious if the parties did not reasonably expect that the contract would be breached.'
Seaman's was generally criticized by both judges and scholars, and
was eventually overruled in Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Bekher Oil Co.'"
Indiana courts have gone even further than California, apparently adopting the position that even ordinary breaches of contract
can be tortious.'5 For example, in FD. Borkholder Co. v. Sandock,' 55
the court found a construction contractor liable for punitive damages for the contractor's intentional failure to follow certain elements of the owner's plans, thereby creating defects that were difficult to detect.5 Although the contractor's conduct did not amount
to fraud or misrepresentation, the court justified the award of punitive damages by referring to the contractor's fraudulent practice.' 57
As a rule, the Indiana courts allow plaintiffs to receive punitive damages for breach of contract "'whenever the elements of fraud, malice,
gross negligence or oppression mingle in the controversy.'"'" This
amounts to an award of tort damages for bad faith breach.' 9
2.

Analysis

The cases awarding tort damages for bad faith breach of contract are misguided. None of the contexts in which tort damages
have been awarded for bad faith breach contain elements that would
indicate that the justifications for limiting contract damages are
weakened.

149 See Seaman's, 686 P.2d at 1166-67.

SOSee id. at 1167.
See id. at 1174-75 (Byrd, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See Freeman &Mills, 900 P.2d at 677-79.
5 900 P.2d 669, 679-80 (Cal. 1995).
I" See Sebert, supra note 18, at 1629-33.
M 413 N.E.2d 567 (Ind. 1980).
156 See id. at 568,
570.
'5
See id. at 570.
1" Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 362 N.E.2d 845, 847 (Ind.
1977)
(quoting Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (Ind. 1976)
(quoting Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322, 325 (Ind. 1854) (citation omitted))).
SSee Sebert, supra note 18, at 1632.
1
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Commercial Insurance Contracts"6

Commercial insurance contracts are generally negotiated, so the
transaction cost of disclosing additional information about likely
consequential damages is low. The low cost of transferring information makes the Hadley rule cheap to apply. The Hadley rule seems
particularly necessary in a commercial insurance context because the
consequential damages of breach are likely to be quite high. As a result, without the Hadley rule, the insured would have a large incentive to understate the magnitude of the expected damages in order
to avoid paying a premium to the insurer for absorbing an unusually
large risk.
The cost of acquiring information without voluntary disclosure
in a commercial insurance context is likely to be high because the
businesses involved can be large and complicated. Without the Hadley rule, the insurer would bear large research costs when it attempts
to discover the insured's expected consequential damages despite
the insured's attempts to hinder this effort. The Hadley rule lowers
the social costs of these transactions by inducing the insured to cooperate by disclosing the expected consequences of the insurer's
breach.
The award of nonpecuniary damages would be inappropriate in
commercial insurance cases. The normal expectation in a business
context is that emotions are not heavily involved in the transaction.
Awarding emotional distress damages would force parties to be
much more careful in choosing transaction partners. In order to
avoid the uncertainty and potentially large liability for emotional distress damages, parties would have an incentive to do business only
with those who are unusually calm and emotionally detached from
the transaction.
In insurance cases, breaches should be easily detectable. In a
first-party situation, the insured should certainly know whether or
not she received an insurance settlement. In the third-party context,
most commercial insureds can be expected to monitor the litigation
closely enough to be aware of settlement offers and to be aware of
the ultimate outcome of the suit. Accordingly, there seems little reason to award supercompensatory damages for insurance cases.

10

The analysis might be somewhat different in the non-commercial context, a

topic not addressed in this article.
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Employment Contracts

In the employment context, the cost of disclosing the magnitude of unusually large expected consequential damages is likely to
be quite high. Particularly for long-term employment contracts, the
consequences of breach will probably change a great deal over time,
necessitating frequent updating and renegotiation. As a result, it is
very unlikely that the promisee will disclose the consequences of
breach without a strong incentive to do so.
The Hadley rule provides such an incentive. The employee will
bear the cost of disclosure if the resulting benefits from shifting the
risk to the employer are sufficiently great. Because the cost of disclosure is so high, the result of applying the Hadley rule may be that no
disclosure occurs and the employer is simply not liable for consequential damages. If this does occur, however, it will be because the
cost of disclosure is greater than the gains of trade from having the
employer bear the risk. Under these circumstances, it is socially desirable for the employee to bear the risk of her own consequential
damages. Hence, the Hadley rule produces the efficient result.
Employees can frequently be expected to suffer emotional distress damages from being wrongfully terminated, yet all the reasons
for excluding nonpecuniary damages from contract disputes are present in full force in employment cases. Typically, the plaintiff will be
an injured, distressed individual suing a relatively wealthy and frequently impersonal corporate employer. This situation is a recipe
for runaway jury verdicts and "back-door" awards of punitive damages. As explained above, the normal contract damage limitations
should apply unless there is an unusual, compelling reason to award
emotional distress damages or unless there is some element in a particular category of cases--for example, employment cases-that
would protect against the dangers of awarding nonpecuniary damages.
Breach detection should be fairly easy in these cases. The employee will obviously be aware of her termination and will be highly
motivated to search for a contract violation. Employers may sometimes be able to cloak an illegal reason for termination behind a superficially valid rationale, but it seems safe to assume that most contract breaches will be detected. If this assumption is correct,
supercompensatory damages should not be awarded. Also, as explained above, the danger in this context of "back-door" punitive
damage awards should make us especially reluctant to give the jury
much discretion in awarding damages.
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Bank Deposit Contracts

The arguments against tort damages in the bank deposit arena
are largely the same as in the employment context. Again, the contract is likely to be long-term, making disclosure of consequential
damages expensive and unlikely to occur, but also socially undesirable. Nonpecuniary damages are likely to be lower than in the employment context, since there are no ego issues of job performance
involved. In addition, the same concerns about juries attempting to
redistribute income from a wealthy corporate defendant to a relatively poor individual plaintiff argue against allowing either nonpecuniary damages or supercompensatory damages. Finally, to the extent consumers examine their monthly statements, the rate of
breach detection should be high.
d.

Bad Faith Denial

Assigning tort liability for bad faith denial of the existence of, or
the defendant's liability under, a valid contract is also problematic.
There is no particular reason to believe that the Hadley rule will fail
to induce the promisee to disclose the efficient level of information,
taking into account the possibility that the contract will not only be
breached, but also denied. It is unlikely that parties would bargain
about who would bear the consequences of a denial of the contract's
existence by one of them. But the consequences of denying the contract's existence would be virtually identical to the consequences of
any other complete contract breach, and the parties would be expected to negotiate about the risks of a complete breach.
The promisee may be particularly outraged that the promisor is
denying the very existence of the contract. But this factor alone is
insufficient to justify awarding nonpecuniary damages. The absence
of any objective limitation on the jury's discretion, together with the
absence of any factor indicating that nonpecuniary damages are particularly justifiable in these cases, weighs against allowing emotional
distress damages for bad faith denial of a contract's existence.
There is no reason to suppose that the plaintiff will remain unaware of the defendant's wrongful denial of the contract's existence.
The plaintiff clearly knows whether the contract exists, and the defendant's refusal to comply with the contract's terms should provide
more than adequate notice to the plaintiff that the defendant is in
breach. Since the chances of detection are relatively certain in this
context, there is no compelling reason to award supercompensatory
damages.
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Bad Faith Breach

The tort of pure bad faith breach of contract, as enforced by
Indiana courts, should not be recognized. As explained in Part IV,
there are valid reasons for the traditional limits on contract damages.
Awarding tort damages for every breach of contract that was somehow committed in "bad faith" circumvents usual damage limitations
without any resulting economic justification. Whether the promisor's reason for breach was that she believed the breach was efficient
or that she wanted to harm her contracting partner makes no difference. It is only when the particular type of breach contains factors
that undermine the reasons for the usual limits on contract damages-such as when the nature of the breach renders the Hadley rule
inadequate for consequential damages, when the breach is unusually
likely to produce large nonpecuniary damages, or when the breach is
particularly difficult to detect-that tort damages should be awarded.
A general rule allowing tort damages whenever the court perceives
some amorphous quality such as "bad faith" invites uncertainty and
inhibits commerce without a counterbalancing economic benefit.
B. Fraud
1. Background
Fraud may sound in either tort or contract.16 1 According to Keeton, the elements of fraud in tort are:
1. A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary
case, this representation must be one of fact.
2. Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is false-or, what is regarded as equivalent, that he
has not a sufficient basis of information to make it. This element
often is given the technical name of "scienter."
3. An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from
action in reliance upon the misrepresentation.
4. Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the
plaintiff, in taking action or refraining from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance. 162
The elements of fraud in contract are the same, except that the
plaintiff need
not show fault; honest misrepresentation is sufficient
1
for liability.

6

supranote 2, § 105, at 727-28.
Id. at 728 (footnotes omitted).

161 SeeKEETON ETAL.,
162
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The vast majority of courts also award tort damages against defendants who commit promissory fraud by making promises without
the present intent to perform. '" Courts require more than the mere
breaking of a promise to find promissory fraud, 65 but a confession is
not required. Promissory fraud can be found based on the surrounding circumstances of the promise,
such as the defendant's insolvency or other reason to know that
he cannot pay, or his repudiation of the promise soon after it is
made, with no intervening change in the situation, or his failure
even to attempt any performance, or his continued assurances after it is clear that he will not do so.'"

Promissory fraud is distinguished from fraudulent misrepresentation, which consists of a "false statement as to material fact, made
with intent that another rely thereon, which is believed by other
party and on which he relies and by which he is induced to act and
does act to his injury .... 167
Within the broad category of fraud, courts generally distinguish
between casually acquired information-information that is obtained without incurring costs specifically targeted at the attempt to
learn something new-and deliberately acquired information-information that is obtained only after bearing costs aimed at
the quest for the new knowledge.'" Courts are more protective of a
party's right to keep secret any information the party has expended
effort to discover. 16 Parties, however, are not permitted to lie even
about deliberately acquired information; they may keep the information secret, but they may not actively mislead other parties." 0
2.

Analysis

a.

Promissory Fraud

Awarding tort damages for promissory fraud is unwise. While
the promisor might appear more deserving of punishment from a
moral standpoint because of the deceptive nature of the breach,
there are no economic justifications for awarding greater damages.
163

16
16

See id. at 729.
See KEETON ETAL., supra note

See id. at 764-65.

2, § 109, at 763.

I6 Id. at 765 (footnotes omitted).
167
168

662 (6th ed. 1990).
S Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of ConBLAcK's LAwDcrIoARY

tracts,7J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13, 18,33 (1978).
169
170

See id.
See POSNER, supra note 12, at 109-13.
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The fact that the promisor does not intend to keep her promise
should not affect the operation of the Hadley rule. Since the promisee is unaware of the promisor's intentions at the time of contract
formation, the promisee should retain efficient incentives to disclose
the appropriate level of information regarding unusually large consequential damages from breach.
The egregious nature of the promisor's breach may produce
some emotional distress in the promisee. But the increase in emotional harm over a typical contract breach should not be great in
most cases. In the absence of some objective measure of the extent
of emotional damage or some factor making nonpecuniary damages
more predictable as a consequence of breach, nonpecuniary damages should not be awarded in contract cases.
The promisor might have some advantage in avoiding breach
detection that stems from her knowledge from the outset that she
would not perform. The level of breach detection, however, depends primarily on the nature of the breach, not when it was
planned. Supercompensatory damages should only be awarded
when the particular type of breach indicates significant uncertainty
in detection. Promissory fraud in and of itself says very little about
the chances of breach detection and thus does not justify the award
of supercompensatory damages.
b.

Fraudulent Misrepresentation

Holding defendants liable in tort for concealing casually acquired information or misrepresenting deliberately acquired information makes sense. The nature of the tortjustifies supercompensatory damages and expanded consequential damages. If a court's
only choice is to allow a suit to sound in contract or in tort, these
cases should sound in tort. If, however, a court is allowed to pick
and choose among the various elements of tort damages instead of
awarding all of the tort remedies or none at all, the court should
award supercompensatory damages and expanded consequential
damages, not nonpecuniary damages.
The Hadley rule can only induce the promisee to disclose her
unusually high expected consequential damages if the promisee herself knows what they will be. When the promisor has misrepresented
the situation to the promisee, the promisee will often be unable to
predict accurately the consequences of the promisor's breach. For
this reason, the Hadley rule will not be effective. The next-best option is for the promisor to use her lesser knowledge of the promisee's business affairs to estimate the likely consequential damages
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and to take these into account when deciding whether to breach. To
force the promisor to internalize the promisee's damages, the
promisor must be made liable for the full consequential damages of
breach.
Ideally, nonpecuniary losses should not be awarded. Fraudulent
misrepresentation is not like a personal injury or wrongful death
claim, in which emotional harm can be expected to be very large.
Nonpecuniary damages should not be awarded because there is
nothing in a misrepresentation claim to provide objective guidance
to the factfinder in setting the magnitude of the damages.
Supercompensatory damages should be allowed for fraudulent
misrepresentation claims. The nature of the tort makes breach detection more difficult, because the promisee may never discover the
true facts surrounding the contract. For example, a computer retailer may have told the owner of a small business that the model the
retailer was selling was state of the art. The retailer charged the consumer a price appropriate to a cutting-edge computer. In fact, the
model the retailer sold was three years old, putting the computer on
the verge of being out of date. Unless the owner has a friend or relative with computer expertise, she may never learn that the machine
is not state of the art and that she was badly overcharged. The lower
chances of detection in fraudulent misrepresentation cases justify
supercompensatory damages.
C. Negligence
1. Background
Simple nonperformance of a contract, or nonfeasance, will
normally produce only contract liability.'
But misfeasance--performing a contract negligently--can sometimes result in
tort liability. 72 According to Keeton:

[T]he American courts have extended the tort liability for misfeasance to virtually every type of contract where defective performance may injure the promisee .... The principle which
seems to have emerged from the decisions in the United States is
that there will be liability in tort for misperformance of a contract
whenever there would be liability for gratuitous performance
without the contract-which is to say, whenever such misper-

1

172

See KEEON ETAL., supranote 2, § 92, at 657.
See id. at 660-62.
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formance involves a foreseeable, unreasonable risk of harm to
the interests of the plaintiff.'7
As explained above in Part VI, courts often have difficulty distinguishing between tort and contract negligence actions and have
developed different tests for distinguishing between them. One test
looks to the nature of the injury
while another focuses on the nature
174
violated.
was
that
duty
the
of
There are also situations in which complete nonperformance
can result in tort liability. Some contracts create an affirmative duty
of care that, when violated, produces tort liability.7 3 The typical example is a bailment contract, in which the bailee, under some circumstances, "may be liable in tort for
7 failure to take ordinary precautions" to protect the bailed goods. 1
2.

Analysis

Contracts breached through a party's negligence should be
treated no differently from contracts breached purposefully. The
common law's focus on the distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance as a basis for determining whether a suit sounds in contract or tort is unwarranted. A party breaches a contract through
negligence because she has failed to take "due care" by deciding to
invest too little in performance.' If she had invested more-by hiring more highly skilled workers, for example-she would not have
been negligent and the contract would not have been breached. A
party breaches through her nonperformance because she has decided not to invest in performance at all. Thus, nonperformance is
merely an extreme case of inadequate investment in performance.
There is nothing particularly unique about a decision to invest something in performance, even if not enough, that would warrant imposing a greater penalty than for breach through complete nonperformance.
This is not to say that tort damages should never be available for
breach of contract suits involving negligence. As explained in Part
Id. at 660-61 (footnotes omitted).
See supraPart VI.
75 See KEETON ETAL., supranote 2, § 92, at
663-64.
176 See id. at 663.
1See Steven P. Croley &Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revised Case
for Enterpise Liability, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 683, 693 (1993); see alsoJason S. Johnston,
Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1385,
1392 (1987); Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standardsof Negligence: Defining the Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers
and Victims, 78 GEO. L.J. 241, 244-45, 254-55 (1989).
173

74
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VII, there are situations in which tort damages should be available
for breach of contract. The common law's allowance of tort remedies for breaches of contract likely to involve personal injury, for example, makes a certain amount of sense. As argued in Part VII.B,
nonpecuniary damages should be available in breach of contract
cases when it was apparent at the time the contract was formed that
personal injury was a likely consequence of breach. This statement is
as true for cases involving negligent breach of contract as it is for
cases involving purposeful breach.
Other elements of the tort remedies, such as punitive damages
and expanded consequential damages, may or may not be appropriate in such cases, depending on the particular circumstances. Courts
should not feel the need to choose between granting all the tort
remedies or none; each element of tort damages should be awarded
as appropriate in each type of case, using the reasoning process outlined above.
IX. CONCLUSION

This article examines one aspect of the "border" area between
contract and tort-when it is possible to sue in tort for breach of
contract. The article proposes a framework for deciding when tort
remedies should be available for breaches of contract, focusing on
the economic justifications for limitations on tort damages in contract actions and examining when those justifications are weakened
in particular contexts. After analyzing a few of the more common
"contorts," the article concludes that bad faith breach suits should
sound in contract, tort remedies should be available for some types
of fraud actions, and breaches of contract involving negligence
should be analyzed in the same way as purposeful breaches.

